CVE-2026-61728

SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. In affected snapshots preceding the respective 0.1.70 and 0.1.76 sink repairs, portal users, including customer_user, can submit stored markup through POST /api/incidents/db_operations/alert/comment. In customer-portal/src/components/alerts/AlertDetails/AlertComment.vue, commentHtml replaces newlines in comment.comment but passes the result to v-html without escaping or sanitizing HTML. When another user views the poisoned alert, stored script executes on the application origin; the same unsanitized rendering pattern affects server-stored SOC case, asset and health-check fields in SocCaseNote.vue, SocCaseItem.vue, SocCaseAssetsItem.vue, SocAlertAssetsItem.vue and HealthcheckItem.vue. The authentication store in customer-portal/src/stores/auth.ts persists both access and refresh tokens in JavaScript-readable storage, and customer-portal/src/api/httpClient.ts uses bearer headers rather than HttpOnly cookies. An injected script can steal both tokens, impersonate the viewer and obtain fresh tokens through /auth/refresh. If an analyst or administrator views the poisoned alert or case, this enables persistent privileged account takeover, cross-tenant data access, incident modification or deletion, and detection/response subversion. The health-check sink repair is first contained in version 0.1.70, while the comment and other SOC sink repairs are first contained in version 0.1.76. Version 0.1.76 is the provisional first release containing all observed repairs; grouped versus split CVE scope requires curator adjudication.